ENB Pub Note: This article is an interesting review of the leaked agreement and potential peace talks. As Stu Turley has been saying, the only way to get President Putin to the table is to talk about possible business deals post-Ukraine/Russian war, with Zelensky out of office, and no more NATO expansion. Stu also pointed out that the war would end with Russia having control of a land bridge to Crimea. We are hopeful the killing will end, and the war will be behind us soon. You can read more from Andrew Korybko on his shubstack.
The overarching theme connecting the substance and timing of this agreement is therefore the US’ eagerness to resolve the Russian-US dimension of the New Cold War in order to prioritize the Sino-US dimension thereof as the next phase of its systemic competition with China over the future world order.
The New York Post, which Trump once called his “favorite newspaper”, just published what it claims to be all 28 points of Russian-Ukrainian peace deal framework that Russia and the US have reportedly been working on in secret over the past few weeks. What follows is the text of each individual point as detailed in the infographic shared in their article on this subject, which will then be concisely analyzed, with some observations about the substance of the agreement and its timing rounding out the analysis:
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1. Ukraine’s sovereignty will be confirmed.
This relates to Russia respecting Ukraine’s right to manage its affairs, both internal and foreign and each in accordance with the terms specified in this agreement. It’s pretty much symbolic and aimed at spinning the outcome of this conflict as a (faux) victory for Ukraine amidst the narrative that was pushed by it and the West that Russia wants to conquer all of the country. Some state-adjacent “Non-Russian Pro-Russians” (NRPR) also inadvertently lent credence to this through their sensationalist commentary.
2. A comprehensive non-aggression agreement will be concluded between Russia, Ukraine and Europe. All ambiguities of the last 30 years will be considered settled.
This relates to reforming the European security architecture and could thus likely be a protracted process due to the issues involved. Some of them include Russia’s access to Kaliningrad, navigation across the Baltic Sea, and its opposition to nukes in Poland, while Poland, whose lost Great Power status is being revived with US support, wants Russian tactical nukes and Oreshniks out of Belarus. The “EU Defense Line” that’s being built between NATO and Russia-Belarus will likely also become a “new Iron Curtain”.
3. It is expected that Russia will not invade neighboring countries and NATO will not expand further.
This quid pro quo, which might include verification and enforcement mechanisms regarding the status of forces along the “new Iron Curtain”, is meant to alleviate their security dilemma and thus facilitate some of the aforesaid compromises. The US would also have a pretext for redeploying of some of its EU-based forces to the Asia-Pacific for more robustly containing China while Russia would have the same for refocusing its strategic attention southward in response to the expansion of Turkish influence there.
4. A dialogue will be held between Russia and NATO, mediated by the United States, to resolve all security issues and create conditions for de-escalation in order to ensure global security and increase opportunities for cooperation and future economic development.
This reinforces what was written with respect to reaching a series of mutual compromises for alleviating their security dilemma with the intent of freeing up US and Russian forces to refocus on the Asia-Pacific and the South Caucasus-Central Asia respectively for balancing China and Turkiye. There’s also the speculative chance that the US could limit the expansion of NATO member Turkiye’s influence there in exchange for Russia limiting its military-technical and possibly energy cooperation with China.
5. Ukraine will receive reliable security guarantees.
It was assessed last March that “Ukraine Already Kinda Has Article 5 Guarantees From Some NATO Countries” due to the raft of “security guarantees” that it agreed to with the bloc’s members over the prior year, all of which are hyperlinked to in the preceding analysis. This point is therefore redundant but might also suggest an openness among those states – the US, Poland, the UK, Germany, France, and Italy – to renegotiate some of the terms to make them even more favorable for Ukraine.
6. The size of the Ukrainian Armed Forces will be limited to 600,000 personnel.
The special operation’s demilitarization goal would be achieved in spirit through these means, though the loophole might be that Ukraine could still employ mercenaries to get around this limit. Nevertheless, with credible verification and enforcement mechanisms in place, the spirit of this point would be respected. Russia should therefore consider proposing this without delay in order to avert the scenario of Ukraine slyly undermining the peace (perhaps in collusion with the subversive and warmongering UK).
7. Ukraine agrees to enshrine in its constitution that it will not join NATO, and NATO agrees to include in its statutes a provision that Ukraine will not be admitted in the future.
Russia’s goal of restoring Ukraine’s constitutional neutrality would be achieved in spirit through these means too, though the “security guarantees” that Ukraine would receive (or rather be grandfathered into a peace deal and possibly expanded upon before it’s signed) make it a shadow member of the bloc. In any case, by not becoming a full member, Russia’s long-running concerns about Ukraine provoking World War III would be alleviated and this could then lay the basis for repairing Russian-NATO relations.
8. NATO agrees not to station troops in Ukraine.
The “career military personnel from France and the United Kingdom” that Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service reported in late September had “already arrived in Odessa” would be quietly withdrawn, but the bloc might greatly build up its capabilities in regional leader Poland as a contingency measure. The purpose would be to deter Russia, albeit within the terms of the new European security architecture that they’ll negotiate, by having NATO forces at the ready to intervene if “Round 2” ever kicks off.
9. European fighter jets will be stationed in Poland.
This point confirms that Poland will lead Russia’s regional containment after the Ukrainian Conflict ends, the role of which arguably evaded Russia’s attention due to it hitherto underestimating Poland as “just another US puppet”. That said, awareness of its role appears to have finally dawned on some influential folks in recent weeks as suggested by the surge in anti-Polish content by state-adjacent NRPRs, which could be meant to precondition the public for expecting a revival of the historical Russian-Polish rivalry.
10. US guarantee:
* The US will receive compensation for the guarantee;
* If Ukraine invades Russia, it will lose the guarantee;
* If Russia invades Ukraine, in addition to a decisive coordinated military response, all global sanctions will be reinstated, recognition of the new territory and all other benefits of this deal will be revoked;
* If Ukraine launches a missile at Moscow or St. Petersburg without cause, the security guarantee will be deemed invalid.
The US will profit from its “security guarantees” to Ukraine just like it now profits from selling weapons to it via NATO; any cross-border movement of troops will provoke the US’ wrath on the side that does so; the US will presumably coerce those with whom it negotiates new trade deals (China, India) to comply with its sanctions against others per the Cambodian and Malaysian precedents as a deterrent to Russia; and Ukraine will presumably be allowed to obtain long-range missile capabilities as another deterrent.
11. Ukraine is eligible for EU membership and will receive short-term preferential access to the European market while this issue is being considered.
The problem is that “Poland Might Impede The EU’s Push To Speedily Grant Ukraine Membership” as was assessed in early November and explained in the preceding hyperlinked analysis. In short, Poland still unilaterally refuses to allow cheap (and low-quality) Ukrainian grain into its domestic market, which would ruin its farmers’ livelihoods and subsequently crash its agricultural industry. An exception for Poland will therefore likely have to be included in this arrangement in order for it to be approved.
12. A powerful global package of measures to rebuild Ukraine, including but not limited to:
a. The creation of a Ukraine Development Fund to invest in fast-growing industries, including technology, data centers, and artificial intelligence;
b. The United States will cooperate with Ukraine to jointly rebuild, develop, modernize, and operate Ukraine’s gas infrastructure, including pipelines and storage facilities;
c. Joint efforts to rehabilitate war-affected areas for the restoration, reconstruction and modernization of cities and residential areas;
d. Infrastructure development;
e. Extraction of minerals and natural resources.
f. The World Bank will develop a special financing package to accelerate these efforts.
The gist is to create global stakes in Ukrainian infrastructure as a deterrent against Russia targeting them in “Round 2” on pain of most stakeholders (likely including China and India) imposing sanctions against it. NATO stakeholders would also at the very least resume their ongoing military-strategic cooperation with Ukraine and at most intervene in the conflict from their Polish bases even if only to race to the Dnieper to de facto partition Ukraine by bringing the west under their umbrella to stop Russia’s advance.
13. Russia will be reintegrated into the global economy:
a. The lifting of sanctions will be discussed and agreed upon in stages on a case-by-case basis;
b. The United States will enter into a long-term economic cooperation agreement in the areas of energy, natural resources, infrastructure, artificial intelligence, data centers, rare earth metal extraction projects in the Arctic, and other mutually beneficial corporate opportunities;
c. Russia will be invited to rejoin the G8.
This point complements the preceding one by giving Russia concrete economic reasons to restrain its hardliners/hawks and aligns with the spirit of the “creative energy diplomacy” proposals that were shared here in January. The tech cooperation aspects will lead to complex interdependence between Russia and the US within the “Fourth Industrial Revolution”/“Great Reset” (4IR/GR) at the possible expense of Putin’s sovereignty plans in this sphere and Russia’s potential cooperation with China therein.
14. Frozen funds will be used as follows:
* $100 billion in frozen Russian assets will be invested in US-led efforts to rebuild and invest in Ukraine. The US will receive 50% of the profits from this venture;
* Europe will add $100 billion to increase the amount of investment available for Ukraine’s reconstruction. Frozen European funds will be unfrozen;
* The remainder of the frozen Russian funds will be invested in a separate US-Russian investment vehicle that will implement joint projects in specific areas. The fund will be aimed at strengthening relations and increasing common interests to create a strong incentive not to return to conflict.
The first part continues the trend of the US profiting from this conflict, first from selling arms to Ukraine via NATO and then receiving compensation for its security guarantees to that country, while the second aligns with the multidimensional deterrence policies suggested in the preceding two points. It’ll also further strengthen complex interdependence between Russia and the US in the spirit of what was suggested here in April with regard to how Russia’s frozen assets could fund big-ticket US deals.
15. A joint American-Russian working group on security issues will be established to promote and ensure compliance with all provisions of this agreement.
This point partially satisfies what was earlier proposed in this analysis regarding the creation of credible verification and enforcement mechanisms but still needs to be fleshed out to be effective. Russia could also importantly employ this channel for preemptively averting joint British-Ukrainian false flag provocations of the sort that its spies have occasionally warned about by getting the US to stop them first. This working group could also help manage the status of forces along the “new Iron Curtain”.
16. Russia will enshrine in law its policy of non-aggression towards Europe and Ukraine.
This will be just as symbolic as confirming Ukraine’s sovereignty and also aimed at spinning the outcome of this conflict as a (faux) victory for Ukraine as was explained in point 1. It remains to be seen whether this will influence the public statements of Russian officials and/or the content produced by publicly financed Russian media (both domestic and international) and state-adjacent NRPRs. Another question is what consequences could follow if Europe and/or Ukraine object to any of their statements or content.
17. The United States and Russia will agree to extend the validity of the treaties on the non-proliferation and control of nuclear weapons, including the START Treaty.
This aligns with Putin’s proposal for extending the New START for another year following its expiry next February, which would give Russia and the US enough time to negotiate its modernization in line with the newest security challenges. Some of the most significant include Trump’s “Golden Dome” megaproject, Russia’s latest missile advancements that were developed in response to the US’ withdrawal from other arms control pacts, drone proliferation, and the militarization of space.
18. Ukraine agrees to be a non-nuclear state in accordance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
Ukraine’s flirtation with developing nuclear weapons in the immediate run-up to the special operation was one of the reasons why Putin ultimately authorized it in order to prevent this from happening. It would therefore be a victory for Russia if Ukraine agreed with this provision, but as with many of the other points in this agreement, credible verification and enforcement mechanisms must be implemented too. These could be negotiated through the joint security working groups stipulated in point 15.
19. The Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant will be launched under the supervision of the IAEA and the electricity produced will be distributed equally between Russia and Ukraine – 50:50.
Russia had hitherto opposed conceding any element of its sovereignty over this power plant so this point represents an indisputable compromise on its part, though it’s a reasonable one when considering the compromises that Ukraine, the EU, NATO, and the US are making as proposed in this agreement. It’ll also importantly help lay the basis for restoring Russian-Ukrainian economic ties after the conflict ends, which could serve as another mutual deterrent against the “Round 2” scenario.
20. Both countries undertake to implement educational programmes in schools and society aimed at promoting understanding and tolerance of different cultures and eliminating racism and prejudice:
a. Ukraine will adopt EU rules on religious tolerance and the protection of linguistic minorities;
b. Both countries will agree to abolish all discriminatory measures and guarantee the rights of Ukrainian and Russian media and education;
c. All Nazi ideology and activities must be rejected and prohibited;
This point would satisfy the special operation’s denazification goal and lay the legal basis for restoring Russian-Ukrainian socio-cultural ties after the conflict ends. It’s also implied that Russian officials, its publicly financed media, and state-adjacent NRPRs can no longer deny the present separateness of the Ukrainian people despite their historical unity with Russians that Putin elaborated on in his magnum opus in July 2021. He himself also importantly wrote therein that this must be treated “with respect!”
21. Territories:
a. Crimea, Luhansk and Donetsk will be recognized as de facto Russian, including by the United States;
b. Kherson and Zaporizhzhia will be frozen along the line of contact, which will mean de facto recognition along the line of contact;
c. Russia will relinquish other agreed territories it controls outside the five regions;
d. Ukrainian forces will withdraw from the part of Donetsk Oblast that they currently control, and this withdrawal zone will be considered a neutral demilitarized buffer zone, internationally recognized as territory belonging to the Russian Federation. Russian forces will not enter this demilitarized zone.
This represents a significant compromise since Russia considers the entirety of the disputed regions to be its own. Point 2 also mandates resolving “all ambiguities of the last 30 years” so Russia couldn’t retain these claims after freezing the front, yet the constitution prohibits the cession of territory. Nevertheless, the legal workaround proposed here in August could be employed, by which the Constitutional Court could rule that there’s no “cession” since the abandoned claims wouldn’t concern land under its control.
22. After agreeing on future territorial arrangements, both the Russian Federation and Ukraine undertake not to change these arrangements by force. Any security guarantees will not apply in the event of a breach of this commitment.
This point reinforces the deterrence policies that were already proposed thus far in the agreement by encouraging political-diplomatic means for settling any future territorial disputes. Explicitly withdrawing the “security guarantees” extended to whichever side uses force against the other, which suggests even drone attacks and shelling (thus including sub-“invasion” hostilities after “invasions” are already prohibited by point 10), is meant to get them to maximally restraint their hardliners/hawks/revisionists.
23. Russia will not prevent Ukraine from using the Dnieper River for commercial activities, and agreements will be reached on the free transport of grain across the Black Sea.
State-adjacent and many casual NRPRs insisted that Russia will liberate Odessa before the conflict ends, yet that most definitely won’t happen if this agreement’s terms are agreed to, which essentially ensure that the lower Dnieper becomes the new border between Russia and Ukraine. Russia never set its sights on this goal, however, as explained here in December 2023. Formalizing Ukraine’s use of the Dnieper River and continued use of the Black Sea after the conflict ends therefore further discredits those figures.
24. A humanitarian committee will be established to resolve outstanding issues:
a. All remaining prisoners and bodies will be exchanged on an ‘all for all’ basis;
b. All civilian detainees and hostages will be returned, including children;
c. A family reunification programme will be implemented;
d. Measures will be taken to alleviate the suffering of the victims of the conflict.
This point complements point 20 in the sense of establishing the basis for restoring Russian-Ukrainian socio-cultural ties after the conflict ends by helping each side overcome the trauma of the last nearly four years as much as is realistically possible. No festering wounds would remain in the humanitarian sense since each would have done everything that they could to make amends in this way. This series of grand gestures would importantly help repair each society’s perceptions of the other with time.
25. Ukraine will hold elections in 100 days.
Russia’s unstated goal of regime change in Ukraine would likely be fulfilled through these means since Zelensky’s popularity was already plummeting even before the latest corruption scandal dealt a deathblow to it. Given the knowledge of this point in the Russian-Ukrainian peace deal that Russia and the US have reportedly been working on in secret, the timing of this latest scandal initiated by the US-backed “National Anti-Corruption Bureau” can be seen in retrospect as a de facto coup against Zelensky.
26. All parties involved in this conflict will receive full amnesty for their actions during the war and agree not to make any claims or consider any complaints in the future.
Full amnesty incentivizes Zelensky, his corrupt clique, and Ukraine’s Neo-Nazi war criminals to go along with this deal and for the first two to agree to the “phased leadership transition” from the prior point. Russia would abandon its plans for a Nuremburg 2.0, but Putin would be free to travel wherever he wants in exchange since the ICC’s warrant would be rescinded. Some among their societies might be enraged that justice won’t be served as they perceive it to be but it’s arguably a pragmatic compromise.
27. This agreement will be legally binding. Its implementation will be monitored by and guaranteed by the Peace Council, headed by President Donald J. Trump. Sanctions will be imposed for violations.
It’s unclear who’ll all comprise the Peace Council and what its responsibilities will be, such as exactly how it’ll guarantee implementation of the agreement’s stipulated terms, but it’ll assumedly have a symbiotic relationship with the joint American-Russian working groups. Another uncertainty is who’ll head the Peace Council after Trump leaves the White House. These details are very important for ensuring lasting peace and will thus certainly be the subject of very intense future negotiations.
28. Once all parties agree to this memorandum, the ceasefire will take effect immediately after both sides retreat to agreed points to begin implementation of the agreement.
In other words, Russia, Ukraine, the US, NATO, the EU, and Poland (where European fighter jets are proposed to be hosted) must agree with these terms (which might be amended) as the prerequisite for a ceasefire (but Russian-Ukrainian agreement is the most important), while the “retreat” relates to Russia withdrawing from Sumy, Kharkov, and Dnipropetrovsk (possibly also the sliver of Nikoalev that it controls in the Kinburn Spit) and Ukraine from the rest of Donbass (leaving that ceded part a demilitarized zone).
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Some observations about the substance of this agreement and its timing are that:
* Russia achieves almost all of its goals in the special operation through Ukraine’s partial demilitarization, its denazification, the restoration of its constitutional neutrality, its abandonment of any nuclear weapons plans, reforming the European security architecture, and Zelensky’s removal (an unstated goal).
* “Round 2” is meant to be averted through “security guarantees” for Ukraine, the build-up of NATO forces in Poland for a direct intervention in that event, global investments in Ukrainian infrastructure as a tripwire for sanctions if Russia strikes them, and the US dumping Ukraine if it violates the agreement.
* Russia’s phased reintegration into the global (Western) economy and the partial use of its frozen funds for financing joint projects with the US, including those pertaining to strategic resources and the 4IR/GR, could complicate its ambitious (but far from fulfilled) plans with BRICS and economic ties with China.
* The preceding observation suggests that the US wants to prevent Russia from becoming China’s raw materials appendage for turbocharging its superpower trajectory and thenceforth more robustly competing with the US in shaping the contours of the emerging Multipolar World Order.
* Likewise, Russia’s agreement with the spirit of those associated proposals (even if their substance is amended through negotiations) would suggest that it fears becoming disproportionately dependent on China, ergo why it would radically recalibrate its geo-economic and tech ties through these means.
* The timing coincides with the US’ significant energy sanctions on Russia, which could backfire by making it more dependent on China to the US’ concern and possibly Russia’s too, and the US-facilitated expansion of NATO member Turkiye’s influence along Russia’s southern periphery via the TRIPP corridor.
* Accordingly, the US is incentivizing Russia to accept this deal by satisfying most of its goals in the conflict while also helping to avert “Round 2” through the previously mentioned means, while Russia must urgently refocus its strategic attention on the South Caucasus-Central Asia in response to Turkiye.
* Ukraine’s latest corruption scandal has also dealt a deathblow to Zelensky’s popularity and could lead to his loss of control over parliament if members of the ruling party defect in protest, thus pressuring him to accept the deal and the “phased leadership transition” therein in exchange for amnesty.
* Objectively speaking, the mutual compromises and deterrents against “Round 2” contained in the agreement are impressively pragmatic, so much so that each side could convincingly claim “victory” and thus make their respective leaders less worried about “losing face” if they were to agree to these terms.
* The successful implementation of the agreement would free up the US and Russia to each “Pivot to Asia”, the first in the sense of more robustly containing China in the Asia-Pacific and the second with regard to creatively counteracting the expansion of Turkiye’s influence along its southern periphery.
* Given that Turkiye is a NATO member under the US’ influence, a quid pro quo might be reached whereby the US limits the expansion of its ally’s influence there in exchange for Russia limiting its military-technical and possibly energy cooperation with China, thus giving the US an edge in their rivalry.
* The overarching theme connecting the substance and timing of this agreement is therefore the US’ eagerness to resolve the Russian-US dimension of the New Cold War in order to prioritize the Sino-US dimension thereof as the next phase of its systemic competition with China over the future world order.
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