In a high-stakes diplomatic maneuver amid escalating global energy tensions, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban is scheduled to meet U.S. President Donald Trump in Washington next week to address the impact of new U.S. sanctions on Russian oil and natural gas exports.
The discussions come at a critical juncture for Hungary, a landlocked Central European nation heavily reliant on Russian energy supplies delivered via aging pipelines. As Europe grapples with its post-Ukraine war energy diversification efforts, Orban has publicly vowed to “circumvent” the sanctions, calling them a “mistake” from a Hungarian perspective.
This meeting underscores the fragile balance between geopolitical alliances and energy security, particularly for countries like Hungary that lack direct access to seaports or alternative import routes. The U.S. sanctions, announced earlier this month, target major Russian oil producers and exporters, aiming to further squeeze Moscow’s war chest by limiting global sales of crude and refined products.
Compounding the pressure, the European Union has confirmed a ban on Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports starting in 2027, signaling a broader transatlantic push to isolate Russia’s energy sector.
For Hungary, these measures threaten to disrupt longstanding supply chains. The country imports nearly all of its oil and gas through the Druzhba pipeline (for crude) and the Brotherhood pipeline (for gas), both originating in Russia and traversing Ukraine and Slovakia. Any interruption could cascade into fuel shortages, skyrocketing prices, and industrial slowdowns in a nation where energy costs already strain households and manufacturers. Orban, a vocal critic of EU sanctions on Russia, has emphasized Hungary’s vulnerability as a landlocked state. “We are working on finding a way to circumvent [the sanctions],” he stated on Friday, highlighting ongoing talks with Trump to build a “sustainable system” without specifying alternatives.
Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó confirmed the meeting will occur in the second half of next week, focusing on how the sanctions affect Budapest’s energy supply.
This comes after a scrapped Trump-Putin summit in Budapest, which Orban had hoped to host to broker Ukraine peace talks.
Analysts see the Orban-Trump dialogue as a potential wedge in U.S.-EU energy policy alignment, with Hungary leveraging its pro-Trump stance to seek exemptions or workarounds.
Hungary’s Precarious Energy Dependence
Hungary’s energy profile exemplifies the challenges of geographic isolation and historical reliance on Russian fossil fuels. With no coastline, the country depends on overland pipelines for 90% of its oil and gas needs, limiting flexibility amid sanctions and geopolitical risks.
Domestic production covers only about 40% of primary energy needs, leaving imports to fill the gap—primarily from Russia, which supplied over 80% of oil and 85% of natural gas in recent years.
Efforts to diversify, such as the Adriatic pipeline via Croatia (handling ~30% of oil imports) and limited LNG access via the Krk terminal in neighboring Croatia, have gained traction but remain insufficient to offset Russian volumes.
Over the last five years (2020-2024), Hungary’s total primary energy supply (TPES) has hovered around 25-26 million tonnes of oil equivalent (Mtoe), declining slightly due to efficiency gains and milder weather, but rebounding post-COVID.
Fossil fuels—oil, natural gas, and coal—continue to dominate at over 65% of the mix, with nuclear providing a stable low-carbon backbone and renewables growing modestly toward a 21% EU-mandated target by 2030.
Hungary’s Energy Mix: 2020-2024
The following table summarizes Hungary’s TPES by major source, based on International Energy Agency (IEA) and Euracoal data. Percentages reflect shares of total TPES, with totals approximating 26 Mtoe in 2020, declining to ~24 Mtoe by 2024.
|
Year
|
Coal (%)
|
Oil (%)
|
Natural Gas (%)
|
Nuclear (%)
|
Renewables (%)
|
Total TPES (Mtoe, approx.)
|
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|
2020
|
6.4
|
28.1
|
33.4
|
16.0
|
12.3
|
26.3
|
|
2021
|
5.5
|
29.0
|
32.5
|
16.0
|
13.0
|
25.8
|
|
2022
|
4.9
|
30.6
|
31.0
|
15.6
|
13.9
|
25.8
|
|
2023
|
3.8
|
31.5
|
30.5
|
17.0
|
14.2
|
24.5
|
|
2024
|
3.2
|
32.0
|
30.7
|
18.1
|
14.5
|
24.0
|
Sources: IEA (2020-2021 estimates interpolated from 2018-2020 data); Euracoal (2022); IEA (2024).
Renewables, including biofuels, solar, and geothermal, have edged up from 12% to 14.5%, driven by solar capacity growth to 4.8 GW by 2022.
Nuclear remains pivotal at ~50% of electricity generation, but fossils underpin transport and heating.
Oil Imports: Heavy Russian Tilt Persists
Hungary imported ~5.3 million tonnes (Mt) of crude oil in 2020, with Russia accounting for 79% via the Druzhba pipeline.
Diversification efforts increased non-Russian shares to ~40% in 2021, but reliance rebounded to 86% by 2024 amid EU exemptions for the pipeline.
Total volumes stabilized around 5-5.5 Mt annually.
|
Year
|
Total Imports (Mt)
|
From Russia (Mt / %)
|
Key Alternatives
|
|---|---|---|---|
|
2020
|
5.3
|
4.2 / 79%
|
Croatia (0.6 Mt), Kazakhstan (0.4 Mt)
|
|
2021
|
5.2
|
3.2 / 61%
|
Croatia, Iraq
|
|
2022
|
5.4
|
4.0 / 74%
|
Croatia (30%)
|
|
2023
|
5.4
|
4.3 / 80%
|
Austria, Romania
|
|
2024
|
5.4
|
4.7 / 86%
|
Croatia (~0.8 Mt)
|
Sources: UN Comtrade/WITS (2020); OSW/Sightline (shares 2021-2024).
Natural Gas Imports: Pipeline Lock-In
Natural gas imports averaged 8-10 billion cubic meters (bcm) annually, with net imports falling to 5.5 bcm in 2024 due to conservation and mild winters.
Russia supplied 85-95% via pipeline, with a 2021 long-term deal for 4.5 bcm/year from Gazprom—now expanding despite sanctions.
LNG trials via Krk added ~1 bcm potential, but pipeline dominance endures.
|
Year
|
Total Imports (bcm)
|
From Russia (bcm / %)
|
Key Alternatives
|
|---|---|---|---|
|
2020
|
9.3
|
8.8 / 95%
|
Austria, Ukraine
|
|
2021
|
10.0
|
8.5 / 85%
|
LNG (Croatia)
|
|
2022
|
9.5
|
8.1 / 85%
|
Azerbaijan (via Bulgaria)
|
|
2023
|
7.0
|
6.0 / 86%
|
Norway
|
|
2024
|
5.5
|
4.7 / 85%
|
LNG (~0.5 bcm)
|
Sources: IEA/Enerdata (totals); WITS (2020 shares); MVM/Gazprom deals.
Coal Imports: Declining and Diversified
Coal plays a minor role (~3-6% of TPES), with imports dropping 54% to 0.2 Mt in 2024 from pandemic highs.
Domestic lignite covers ~50%, and imports are diversified away from Russia (21% in 2020).
|
Year
|
Total Imports (Mt)
|
From Russia (Mt / %)
|
Key Alternatives
|
|---|---|---|---|
|
2020
|
1.3
|
0.3 / 21%
|
US (0.6 Mt), Poland (0.2 Mt)
|
|
2021
|
1.0
|
0.2 / 20%
|
Czechia, US
|
|
2022
|
0.8
|
0.1 / 13%
|
Czechia (27%)
|
|
2023
|
0.5
|
0.05 / 10%
|
Poland, Germany
|
|
2024
|
0.2
|
0.01 / 5%
|
Czechia (0.05 Mt)
|
Sources: IEA/Euracoal (totals); UN Comtrade (2020).
Outlook: Pipelines Under PressureOrban’s trip to Washington could yield U.S. leniency or technical exemptions, but broader EU alignment may limit gains. Hungary’s National Energy Strategy eyes nuclear expansion (Paks II) and renewables to cut import risks by 2030, yet short-term sanctions could hike costs 20-30% if Russian flows falter.
For a landlocked economy, the stakes are existential: stable energy is the lifeblood of growth. As Trump and Orban negotiate, the world watches whether realpolitik trumps sanctions—or vice versa.
Energy News Beat delivers timely insights on global energy markets. Follow for updates on the Orban-Trump talks.
Got Questions on investing in oil and gas?
Crude Oil, LNG, Jet Fuel price quote
ENB Top News
ENB
Energy Dashboard
ENB Podcast
ENB Substack


Be the first to comment