How Long Can China Survive After Losing Venezuela and Iraq’s Discounted Oil Supplies?

In an increasingly volatile global energy landscape, China—the world’s largest oil importer—relies heavily on discounted crude from sanctioned or geopolitically unstable suppliers to fuel its economy. Venezuela and Iraq together provide a significant portion of these imports, often at below-market prices due to sanctions on Venezuelan oil and competitive pricing from Iraqi heavy crudes. But what if these supplies were cut off?

This article explores China’s oil storage levels, volumes in transit, and whether Russia could step in to fill the gap, amid questions about Moscow’s spare production and shipping capacity.

China’s Reliance on Venezuelan and Iraqi Oil

China’s crude oil imports hit a record 11.55 million barrels per day (bpd) in 2025, driven by low prices and stockpiling amid global oversupply. Venezuela supplied around 470,000 to 642,000 bpd, accounting for about 4.5% of China’s seaborne imports. This oil, often Merey heavy crude, arrived at steep discounts—typically $14–$15 per barrel below Brent, and occasionally up to $21 below—due to U.S. sanctions that limited Western buyers. China absorbed 75–80% of Venezuela’s total exports in 2025, benefiting from the sanctions-evasion ecosystem that kept prices low.

Iraq, a more stable supplier without direct sanctions, provided around 1.2 million bpd in 2025, or about 10–12% of China’s imports. While not as heavily discounted as Venezuelan crude, Iraqi grades like Basrah Heavy offered competitive pricing for China’s independent “teapot” refiners, who process sour, heavy oils on thin margins. Together, these sources delivered approximately 1.7 million bpd of discounted supply—critical for China’s energy security and refining economics.

China’s total oil consumption averaged around 15.2 million bpd in 2025 (based on apparent consumption of 760 million metric tons, converted at approximately 7.3 barrels per ton). Domestic production contributed about 4.2 million bpd, leaving imports to cover the rest. Losing 1.7 million bpd would create a substantial gap, equivalent to roughly 11% of consumption or 15% of imports.

China’s Oil Storage: A Buffer Against Disruption

China has aggressively built up reserves in recent years, blending strategic petroleum reserves (SPR) with commercial stockpiles. As of early 2026, total onshore crude inventories stood at approximately 1.2 billion barrels, covering about 104 days of net imports at 2025 levels.

To break this down:

Strategic Reserves: Around 400 million barrels, managed by the government for emergencies.
Commercial Stocks: Approximately 670–800 million barrels, held by refiners and traders, with flexibility for rotation.

If China lost 1.7 million bpd from Venezuela and Iraq, these reserves could theoretically cover the shortfall without depleting all stocks.

Here’s the calculation:Daily gap: 1.7 million bpd.
Total reserves: 1.2 billion barrels.
Days to cover gap (using full reserves): 1,200,000,000 barrels ÷ 1,700,000 bpd ≈ 706 days (about 1.9 years). However, this assumes drawing down everything, which is unrealistic as some stocks are operational minimums.
More conservatively, using only SPR (400 million barrels): 400,000,000 ÷ 1,700,000 ≈ 235 days (about 8 months).
If drawing from total reserves at a sustainable rate (e.g., 50% depletion to maintain buffers): Around 350–400 days.

These figures assume no other supply adjustments. In practice, China would diversify imports while drawing stocks, extending the buffer.