Last Thursday, Indian opposition figure Arvind Kejriwal, the chief minister of the Delhi capital territory, was arrested on corruption charges. The move came just a month before India’s national elections, which are held over several weeks, begin.
The action against Kejriwal followed other arrests of prominent opposition politicians, including three other former senior leaders in Kejriwal’s Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) and the former chief minister of the state of Jharkhand. Rahul Gandhi, a top leader of the main opposition Indian National Congress party, was convicted on defamation charges last year for insulting Prime Minister Narendra Modi, but the conviction was later suspended by the Indian Supreme Court.
The Congress party said last week that it can’t campaign properly because Indian income tax officials have frozen its bank accounts due to a tax dispute. A recent law also gives the prime minister a seat on the selection committee for the three-member Indian Election Commission; two members recently resigned, and the new system was used to appoint their successors.
Some observers say these developments suggest a nervous Modi is taking steps to better shape the electoral environment in his favor.
However, the Modi government’s recent moves reflect confidence about the election rather than concern. Whether the prime minister genuinely seeks to curb corruption within the political ranks or is simply using it as a pretext to sideline his rivals, he knows that his actions won’t hurt him politically.
Elsewhere in the region, opposition figures facing government crackdowns—such as former Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan—enjoy sizable public support, making the measures politically damaging. Aside from Gandhi, the leaders recently targeted in India don’t have massive national followings, and their parties’ clout is geographically limited.
Modi can also fall back on his own massive popularity. A survey released earlier this month gives him a 75 percent approval rating. He has faced numerous political challenges that haven’t affected his popularity in the long term, from the catastrophic COVID-19 surge in 2021 to unrelenting unemployment. Modi is popular for many reasons: a Hindu nationalist agenda that fires up his base, a robust foreign policy, and soaring achievements in other realms.
Many Indian voters also perceive Modi as an incorruptible, non-dynastic figure who gets things done and keeps his promises, from implementing social welfare policies to building the controversial Ram Mandir temple. There is a reason one of his current campaign slogans is emphasizing the “Modi Guarantee”—that the leader comes through when he needs to.
Accordingly, Modi’s base may see his curbing of opposition leaders and parties as reflecting the very principles they admire and channeling the muscular nationalism that defines the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Criticism of such moves as politically motivated is dismissed as interference.
On Wednesday, India’s Foreign Ministry strongly objected to a U.S. State Department official’s call for a fair and transparent legal process for Kejriwal, describing the comment as interference in India’s domestic affairs, and summoned a senior U.S. diplomat.
Certainly, many Indians are angry about Kejriwal’s arrest, including the AAP supporters protesting this week. But they are a small percentage of India’s nearly 1 billion registered voters. The government’s pre-election moves may momentarily unite a fractured opposition, but they won’t make many dents in Modi’s popularity or undercut his electoral prospects.
What We’re Following
U.S. officials say IS-K behind Moscow attack. The Islamic State claimed responsibility for the mass-casualty attack at a Moscow-area concert hall last Friday. But U.S. officials, who shared intelligence with Russia in an advance warning of a major terrorist threat, have specified that they believe the Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K), an Afghanistan-based affiliate and Taliban rival, was responsible for the attack.
IS-K has become one of the Islamic State’s most active and potent affiliates, carrying out many attacks in Afghanistan, a few dozen in Pakistan, and a handful in Central Asia. These include a bombing outside the Kabul airport during the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan that killed more than 160 Afghans and 13 U.S. service members and an attack on the Russian Embassy in Kabul in 2022. There has also been a recent surge in attacks and plots linked to IS-K in the Middle East and Europe.
In the last year, senior U.S. officials have warned that IS-K is developing the capacity to threaten U.S. interests far beyond its base in Afghanistan, but tracking the threat is difficult with no diplomatic or military presence in the country. This increasing concern could have implications for U.S. ties with Pakistan: U.S. officials have sought to refocus the relationship on economic cooperation, but they may be inclined to explore new counterterrorism collaborations.
Maldives’ Muizzu softens tone on India. Maldives President Mohamed Muizzu, who campaigned last year on a platform of expelling India’s military presence while seeking stronger ties with China, told local journalists last week that India—a long-standing partner—remains his country’s “closest ally.” He also praised New Delhi as a generous aid and development partner.
For those following Muizzu since he took office last November, this isn’t surprising: Even as he has courted Beijing and doubled down on his pledge to oust the Indian military, he has called for continued friendship with New Delhi. Muizzu’s goal seems not to put the Maldives firmly in China’s camp, but rather to ensure that there is more balance between the country’s relations with India and China.
There are, however, both economic and political reasons why Muizzu wants to send a conciliatory message now. He is currently seeking debt relief from India. And the Maldives holds parliamentary elections on April 21, and Muizzu’s political rivals—who control the legislature—have bashed him for jeopardizing a critical partnership.
Pakistan to expel more Afghan refugees. When Pakistani officials announced a controversial plan last year to expel hundreds of thousands of Afghan migrants and refugees, they insisted that it would only apply to those who were undocumented. But this week, Pakistan’s Dawn reported that authorities are planning a second phase of expulsions that will include hundreds of thousands of Afghans with documentation, citing provincial officials in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
The plan is expected to begin this summer, although it is waiting on final approval from the federal government. If implemented, the measure will generate significant global criticism. The policy should be seen in the context of Pakistan’s mounting concerns about terrorism threats in Afghanistan, especially those posed by Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), an ally of the Afghan Taliban that has carried out dozens of attacks in Pakistan in recent years.
Islamabad believes that the Taliban aren’t doing enough to deal with the TTP threat. This month, Pakistan staged cross-border strikes that targeted TTP bases in Afghanistan. The broader refugee expulsion plan is likely intended to maintain pressure on the Taliban to help Pakistan deal with the TTP. The tactic is unlikely to work, and it will certainly add to the hardships of the Afghans caught up in the tensions between the two governments.
Bangladesh plans to introduce a new artificial intelligence law in the coming months, Law Minister Anisul Huq announced on Thursday, noting that it will be “for human rights protection and the benefit of people.” A senior telecommunications and IT policy official, Zunaid Ahmed Palak, said AI can’t be ignored “if we want to make a smart Bangladesh.”
In this regard, Bangladesh is not alone in South Asia. India is also working on a draft regulatory framework for AI. But other countries in the region are further behind. Dhaka likely wants to be able to cite an AI law as evidence that Bangladesh is building up its digital economy to attract investment from technology firms.
That may be a hard sell: Bangladesh, like India and Pakistan, trumpets its growing tech sector but also cracks down on internet content, often using online security laws as a pretext.
Lawyer Semanta Dahal describes in the Kathmandu Post the troubled state of federalism in Nepal: “The Constitution leaves provincial governments with weak authority and makes them vulnerable to manipulation by a paternalistic federal government,” he writes.
In the Dhaka Tribune, banker Sanjay Bhattacharjee lays out a long-term action plan for tackling inflation in Bangladesh. He calls for more agricultural productivity and improved transportation, while noting that the “growth of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) can also increase competition. It leads to lower prices and reduced inflation.”
Student Qamar Shahzad, writing in South Asian Voices, highlights how nuclear states in South Asia name their weapons systems. Most other countries with nuclear weapons use alphanumeric codes or acronyms, but “[t]he nomenclature of South Asia’s strategic arsenal, however, is intertwined with the region’s religious, historical, and cultural context,” he explains.
