The worse that the Sino-Indo security dilemma and associated mutual perceptions become as a result of their journalist dispute, the more important Russia’s role will be in serving as a bridge between them. It might never be requested by both to mediate their border dispute, but its media will always accurately report about them to prevent the other from being misled by American media reports about their rival.
Bloomberg reported on Monday that China just asked the last Indian journalist in the country to leave by the end of the month, which will likely doom the chances of India renewing the visa of the last Chinese journalist on its territory. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin said during a press conference on the same day that “we hope that India will meet China halfway” on resolving their journalist dispute, but this might just be wishful thinking considering how much ties have deteriorated.
The crux of those Asian Great Powers’ problem is their decades-long border dispute, which remains at an impasse despite multiple rounds of meetings aimed at peacefully resolving this issue after they almost went to war over it in summer 2020. Contrary to popular perceptions in the Alt-Media Community, Sino-Indo tensions are strictly bilateral despite America’s incessant attempts to divide-and-rule them. India’s growing military ties with the US don’t equate to an alliance, nor do they presage it joining “NATO Plus”.
This South Asian state is multi-aligned but non-allied, which explains its balancing act between Russia and the US, among other key players in the global systemic transition. India’s grand strategic goal is to maximally strengthen its hard-earned strategic autonomy in the New Cold War with a view towards facilitating its vision of informally leading the Global South. The comprehensive expansion of relations with Russia and the US is regarded as the pillar of this policy.
China is seen by Indian policymakers as an aspiring superpower whose astronomical rise must be managed lest it lead to a system of unipolarity in Asia, which in the global context would essentially result in the bifurcation of International Relations between China and the US. In that scenario, India would then feel compelled to become the US’ junior partner while Russia would feel compelled to become China’s, which both want to avoid since it would be at the expense of their strategic autonomy.
For this reason, Russia will always remain among India’s top partners anywhere in the world since the weakening of their strategic relations would risk setting the abovementioned scenario into motion, which is why nobody should expect the US to succeed with its plans to divide those two. At the same time, however, the US also occupies a crucial position in Indian grand strategy due to their shared goal of more actively managing China’s rise.
From China’s perspective, India’s balancing act between Russia and the US might be too difficult to maintain indefinitely, which risks the scenario of it drifting so close to the latter that it ultimately becomes the West’s largest-ever vassal state with time. That could lead to the US exploiting India as its proxy for opening up a so-called “second front” against China along the Himalayas in the event that these two superpowers end up going to war over Taiwan.
China’s military-strategic partnership with Pakistan acts as a partial deterrent to India playing this role at the US’ behest, but Beijing would of course prefer for Delhi to not even contemplate that scenario. This explains why China tolerates Russia’s arming of India despite the latter deploying many of these wares along their disputed border since Beijing hopes that those two’s partnership can serve to prevent Delhi from becoming Washington’s proxy for opening up a “second front” if war breaks out over Taiwan.
The four preceding paragraphs summarized the Sino-Indo security dilemma from each party’s perspective, which shows how suspicious they are of one another right even though they still formally cooperate through BRICS and the SCO. These mutual perceptions will only worsen as a result of their journalist dispute since neither will be able to receive information from the ground about the other, which could in turn make it comparatively easier for the US to divide-and-rule them through the media.
For instance, false reports could be spread by the US about India allegedly planning to join “NATO Plus” in order to exacerbate China’s threat perception of it with the intent of prompting an overreaction that could then turn this political fantasy into a self-fulfilling prophecy. Likewise, equally false reports could also be spread by the US about China’s alleged activities along the Himalayas in order to exacerbate India’s threat perception of it for the purpose of generating domestic support for joining “NATO Plus”.
Neither Chinese nor Indian society should therefore rely on American media for informing them about the other but should instead turn towards their shared Russian partner’s. The worse that the Sino-Indo security dilemma and associated mutual perceptions become, the more important Moscow’s role will be in serving as a bridge between them. It might never be requested by both to mediate their border dispute, but its media will always accurately report about them to prevent the other from being misled.
Chinese and Indian officials should therefore consider signaling to their respective populations that it’s best to rely on Russian media for the latest news about the other going forward in order to prevent them from being misled by potentially false American reports. The Sino-Indo split mustn’t become a 21st-century form of the Sino-Soviet one that’s exploited by the US to divide-and-rule Eurasia in the New Cold War just like it successfully did with its predecessor in the Old Cold War.
