‘Turkey ships more Russian oil to Europe than India’: Energy expert rips Trump’s tariff logic

In a scathing critique of the Trump administration’s recent imposition of tariffs on Indian goods, energy expert Dr. Anas Al Hajji has highlighted what he sees as glaring inconsistencies in U.S. policy toward countries importing Russian energy. The tariffs, set at 50% overall with 25% specifically tied to India’s purchases of Russian crude oil, are accused of being politically motivated rather than genuinely aimed at curbing funding for Russia’s war in Ukraine. Al Hajji points out that Turkey, which imports substantial volumes of Russian natural gas and petroleum products, exports more refined products derived from Russian oil to Europe than India does—yet faces no similar penalties or accusations of supporting the conflict.

This disparity, he argues, undermines the logic behind targeting India while overlooking larger players like Turkey, China, and even the EU itself.

Al Hajji’s comments come amid heightened U.S. pressure on India to reduce its Russian oil imports, with threats to jeopardize ongoing trade deals. He dismisses the narrative that India’s imports are uniquely funding Russia’s war efforts, noting that “no one accused Turkey of supporting the war” despite its significant role in re-exporting Russian-sourced products to Europe.

Furthermore, he highlights that the EU imported 12% of its natural gas from Russia last month, and China remains a major buyer, without facing similar backlash.

Al Hajji suggests the tariffs are more about gaining leverage in India’s vast market than geopolitical strategy, and he questions why U.S. imports from Russia have increased under Trump without self-accusation.

Examining the Volumes: Russian Energy Flows via Turkey and India to the EU in 2025

To assess Al Hajji’s claims, let’s look at the data on volumes of oil, liquefied natural gas (LNG), and refined products shipped to the European Union (EU) via Turkey and India in 2025. Since the year is ongoing (as of September 29, 2025), figures are based on year-to-date (YTD) data through August or September, annualized for full-year estimates where possible. These intermediaries—Turkey and India—import Russian crude and gas, refine some into products like diesel and gasoline, and re-export to the EU, exploiting loopholes in Western sanctions.

Key insights:

Oil (Crude): Both countries import significant Russian crude, but direct shipments to the EU are limited due to sanctions. Instead, Russia exports crude to Turkey and India, which then process and re-export refined products.
LNG: Russian LNG flows directly to the EU remain substantial, but re-exports via Turkey or India are minimal. Turkey imports Russian gas primarily via pipelines (e.g., TurkStream), while India imports little Russian LNG.
Refined Products: This is where the “loophole” is most evident. India and Turkey refine Russian crude into diesel, gasoline, and other products, then export to the EU. The EU’s 18th sanctions package, adopted mid-2025, aims to close this by banning such imports from January 2026, potentially cutting 250,000 barrels per day (b/d) of diesel supply.

Below is a breakdown by shipping country (Turkey and India as intermediaries) for the estimated 2025 volumes to the EU. Volumes are in million metric tons (mt) unless noted; estimates are derived from monthly data annualized (e.g., Jan-Aug data scaled to 12 months). Sources include Reuters, CREA (Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air), and commodity trackers.

These figures support Al Hajji’s assertion that Turkey plays a larger role in supplying Russian-derived products to Europe, particularly when considering the proportion of Russian crude processed for export. Turkey bought 6% of Russia’s crude exports in Aug 2025, refining much for EU markets, while India’s exports, though voluminous, are spread across regions.

However, India’s diesel flows to Europe have surged in 2025, driven by EU stockpiling ahead of the 2026 ban.

Overall, the EU remains Russia’s top LNG buyer (50% share), underscoring policy hypocrisy.

Why Additional Tariffs on India Could Be Detrimental to the US Dollar

Beyond the inconsistencies in tariff application, imposing additional penalties on India risks broader economic repercussions for the U.S., particularly undermining the dollar’s global dominance. By tying trade deals to energy politics, the U.S. could alienate India, pushing it toward deeper alliances with China and Russia. This might accelerate the use of non-dollar currencies like the yuan or rupee in bilateral trade, bypassing the U.S. financial system.

Such moves fuel dedollarization trends, as seen in BRICS initiatives promoting local currency settlements and alternatives to SWIFT. The weaponization of sanctions has already prompted countries like India and China—major holders of U.S. debt—to seek ways to mitigate risks, potentially leading to higher U.S. borrowing costs, inflation, and reduced global influence.

Recent U.S. protectionist policies, including February 2025 tariffs, have sparked backlash, encouraging allies to rethink dollar-denominated trade.

In essence, targeting India without addressing similar flows through Turkey or direct EU imports could backfire, hastening a multipolar financial world where the dollar’s reserve status erodes. As Al Hajji notes, these tariffs seem less about Ukraine and more about market access— a strategy that may cost the U.S. more than it gains.

We are seeing more and more countries trading in their own currencies rather than the US Dollar. Here is a summary of the US Dollar index for 2025. Some fluctuation should be expected as President Trump addresses the trade imbalances, but I believe he may be receiving bad advice on India and in the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

Avoid Paying Taxes in 2025

Crude Oil, LNG, Jet Fuel price quote

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